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Science vs. Scientism
I spent my last post explaining how the philosophy of Pragmatism was shaped by hard science and now I am going to explain how one of the ironies of Pragmatism is that although it was heavily influenced by science, it was also battling against the encroaching materialistic worldview of science. This is a debate that continues to this day to define many of the contours of American Philosophy. In this post I want to begin to outline some of my early – and most likely poorly formed – thoughts on this topic and expose myself to the sharp minds of you my readers, for the betterment of my understanding and our investigation.
One crucial distinction that must be understood to be able to perceive what this ongoing debate is about is the distinction between science and scientism. Science is a method of inquiry and the knowledge acquired by that method. The scientific method – inquiry by hypothesis, experimentation, observation and conclusion – was the explosive discovery that ignited the age of Enlightenment in Europe and skyrocketed humanity out of the Dark Ages. Scientism as described by Joseph Margolis in his book The Unraveling of Scientism is “the assured validity of a metaphysics deemed…overwhelmingly favored by the self-appointed champions of science.” In other words, as I understand it, scientism is the belief that the methods of science and the worldview of science are obviously correct over all other methods and worldviews.
The first Pragmatists were scientifically inclined and even scientifically trained, yet they still opposed this type of scientism. Even Chauncey Wright, a most ardent empiricist, materialist and even nihilist, was disinclined toward scientism. In fact it was the strictness of Wright’s adherence to empiricism that might account for his insistence that his belief in God, and Religion in general, should be held separate from the demand for scientific validation.
Both Chauncey Wright and Charles Sanders Peirce were professionally occupied with scientific measurements and both were very familiar with the limits thereof. For this reason neither of them felt that any of our so-called natural laws could be taken as fact. The measurements that human beings are able to make are always approximate and therefore no law could ever be proven beyond being a useful approximation. For this reason we cannot assume that we are correct about our scientific theories or conclusions, but can only state that those theories and conclusions are the best fit to the evidence that our current ability to measure yields. Wright would therefore never want to generalize in the way that scientism does and to assume that the ideas and methods of science have some special advantage beyond what is verifiable through direct observation and measurement.
In a later post I will expand on how this position led Charles Sanders Peirce to develop a powerful evolutionary metaphysics, but for now I want to explain more deeply what I see as scientism by illustrating with any example. On this blog the notion of Occam ’s razor has been used in comments to argue in favor of Natural Selection over teleology, and for Behaviorism over freewill. Occam ’s razor as I understand it is a rule of thumb for inquiry. It states that given two explanations for the same phenomenon it is best to assume the one that requires the least number of assumptions is correct. Certainly this is a good guide for reason and inquiry, but it is not a proof.
If we argue that the theory of Natural Selection explains evolution and then use Occam’s razor to assert teleology is not part of the evolution process then I feel that we are slipping into scientism. This, in my mind, is an over-extension of Occam’s razor. Just because the explanation of Natural Selection does not require the assumption of teleology doesn’t mean that there is no teleology. In fact the use of Occam’s razor circumnavigates the real issue at hand which is that Natural Selection cannot explain all of evolution. It explains a great deal of evolution, but to say that it proves that all of evolution takes place without any guidance other than chance variation and survival of the fittest is extending and generalizing the theory beyond what it could possibly be validated through observation and therefore Natural Selection can only be a theory that could never be completely proven. Some would say that it is the best theory we have to explain evolution, but others would claim differently. Neither could prove their point.
My point here however is not about this particular argument; it is to illuminate the idea of scientism as I am coming to understand it. The scientism in this example rests not in the argument, but in the fact that the agreement with the methodology of Occam’s razor is presumed to be a complete assurance of the validity of the claim. In other words it is assumed that agreement with Occam’s razor is proof enough and this kind of scientism often expresses a sense of obviousness designed to make any disagreement seem ridiculous. In Margolis’ book he writes about how over the last century scientism and the philosophies that have latched onto it, have not come any closer to proving their superiority in explain certain critical aspects of reality like human knowledge, human behavior or ethical conduct, in spite of working explicitly to do so.
A good treatment of Occam’s razor (cut and paste URL): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_razor
Our understanding of evolution is itself evolving, and future understandings of evolution may well be based on yet to be discovered evidence for teleology
And maybe the principle of Occam’s Razor contradicts itself ie is Occam’s Razor itself one of the least number of assumptions that we need to make?
“Science is a method of inquiry and the knowledge acquired by that method.” What method? What knowledge? How do we know that we have knowledge?
Feyerabend showed that if history is any judge, then science is a hodge-podge chaos of methods. Laudan showed, using history, that all attempts to formulate demarcation criteria have failed. He showed that the modern definition of “science” is very heterogeneous. Very little effort is required to advance the case Laudan began to show that the formal definition of “science” can be rendered so heterogeneous as to be meaningless.
Others have questioned how we know that theories are correct. At this point, there is no epistemologically-satisfactory set of criteria for theory choice.
Welcome to flatland!
There are some very powerful and valid criticisms of science and I am reading a few right now that are helping me see both what was absolutely unprecedentedly remarkable about science and also what its shortcomings are if it is extended beyond where it reasonably applies. Tom, I have not as yet met with criticisms as definitivly negative as what you are saying comes from Laudan, and I see a great danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater if we, as Carl implies, relativise everything.
Sorry to cut and paste, as this blog is a great forum for original expression. But this topic requires more expertise than I can muster. So I turn to Michael Shermer on “The Scientific Method”.
Elements of the scientific method ( hypothetico-deductive):
Induction — Forming a hypothesis by drawing general conclusions from existing data.
Deduction — Making specific predictions based on the hypothesis.
Observation — Gathering data, driven by hypothesis that tell us what to look for in nature.
Verification — Testing the predictions against further observations to confirm or falsify the initial hypothesis.
Through the scientific method, we may form the following generalizations:
Hypothesis — A testable statement accounting for a set of observations.
Theory — A well-supported and well-tested hypothesis or set of hypotheses.
Fact — A conclusion confirmed to such an extent that it would be reasonable to offer provisional agreement.
Through the scientific method, we aim for objectivity: basing conclusions on external validation. And we avoid mysticism: basing conclusions on personal insights that elude external validation. Science leads us toward rationalism: basing conclusions on logic and evidence. And science helps us avoid dogmatism: basing conclusions on authority rather than logic and evidence.
It is important to recognize the fallibility of science and the scientific method. But within this fallibility lies its greatest strength: self-correction.
Albert Einstein: “One thing I have learned in a long life: that all our science, measured against reality, is primitive and childlike — and yet it is the most precious thing we have.”
The purpose of the above post is to set forth a concise defininition of the scientific method to allow those who are skeptical to make their case.
Thank you, Brian.
Wow! You all really need to move into the 20th century! (Yes, I know that it’s the 21st, that’s the point.) Read your 20th century Feyerabend. Shermer is a joke.
TomH: I was hoping for a thoughtful discussion, not name calling. Shermer has a great sense of humor, but he himself is not a joke nor are his ideas. Care to make your point more clearly?
Brian, I didn’t intend to offend. Shermer is a crank when it comes to philosophy of science. He is current as of 1950 or so.
Have you read Feyerabend’s “Against Method” yet? Here is the conclusion for those who lack the time to read the whole thing. http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43843
Richard Feynman, it turns out, was an excellent philosopher as well as an excellent teacher of physics. His talk, “What is science?”, predates even Feyerabend. http://www.fotuva.org/feynman/what_is_science.html
Ah! the discussion is becoming hot !
To Tom, as a scientist I would certainly not qualify Mister Feynman of a good philosopher. One just has to read the text that you gave to us to understand that he is just playing with words, and is not very serious in his philosophical views. Surely he is joking, Mister Feynmann …!
AS for feyerabend’s,if udnertsood well the conclusion that you gave to us to read, what he addresses here is the sociology of the sicentific community, which is closer to the mythical society than anything else. This I would most certainly agree with. The community is so arrogant that most of the new ideas become rapidly dogmas; the scientists who discovered them become idols with much too much moral authority. This in history of science has led to countless lack of recognition , sometimes of the most fantastic genius that our humanity has produces. I think of Tesla and Blaise Pascal, who are for me the grestest of the greatest (with maybe Einstein) but I even put Tesla above. I think of this unknown young guy i Lyon who discoevred the pennicilin in 1890’s, roughly 50 years before Flemming, and who got completely un-recognized because his discovery that bacteria could be so useful was completely counter the dogma of the time. The poor guy died like millions of some infection in the first world war, death which could have been avoided by his own discovery. So yes, the sicentific mind proceeds technicaly through intuitive steps and
lights,aand the community is quite unevolved through many respects.
Nevertheless there exist a scientific Method, which has been perfectly summarized by Brian. It defines a deonthological code of conduit of the scientist. It has proven to be quite efficient in
producing new technology. My personal opinion is that it would be of the greatest interest for humanity to get such a Method valid for th spiritual investigation.
Tom you ask what is knowledge. I believe Socrates is still the Master here; knowledge is what enables you to tell which absolute certainly when you don’t know anymore. Knowledge knows absolutely where it ends, where the frontier is. It looks like nothing, but to know this, with absolute clarity, you need to know a lot. Once the frontier of knowledge is reached, true intelligence can flourish.
I feel I am awfully old fashioned here, but well, for me the two situations are completely different:
1)to knwo something extremely well, as well as an expert can, and thus to know with the best possible calrity where your knowledge ends
2) to do as if you didn’t know what you obviously know, or to do as if you do know what you obviously don’t (which is of course the same thing).
This second attitude I would as well qualify as “flatland”. The first one is part of the scientific method.
Catherine:
You might go back and re-read that first paragraph in the Feyerabend link.
Feynman was ever an advocate of freedom and creativity in the investigation of nature. It is ludicrous to suppose that he was joking in his article which argued that very thing and was opposed to dogmatism in method.
If “scientism is the belief that the methods of science and the worldview of science are obviously correct over all other methods and worldviews” (par. 2), what other “methods” or “worldviews” are 1) as useful, 2) as self-correcting, 3) as testable, 4) reflect perceivable reality as accurately?
Virtually any form of theology is impervious to correction nearly all the time. When the facts don’t fit the “truth”, facts are dispensed with.
By the above definition, I suspect I agree with “scientism”, despite the pejorative connotations which that implies.
Are scientists defensive about their favorite ideas? Do not all scientists follow some approved model all the time? Do scientists tend to stomp on new ideas? Do new paradigms take hold mostly when the “old guard” has died off? Surprise, surprise – scientists are humans, like the rest of us. None of us operate at our optimums in any way, shape or form save for very brief moments of time. This is one facet of human “suboptimalism”.
Inductive reasoning accepts the fact that nothing can be proven conclusively for all time. Everything is subject to falsification. Yes, “…theories and conclusions are the best fit to the evidence that our current ability to measure yields…” (par. 4) and that is the way it has to be. Nothing in the perceptible world can be known with absolutely certainty. Observed process-events are the “premises” upon which all further reasoning is based. Absolute certainty can be gained only in deductive reasoning wherein the premises cannot be true while the conclusion based on them is false. And that is the problem with deductive reasoning and our profound desire for absolute certainty. The premises must be true for the conclusion to be of any use. You cannot use a chain of 100%-certain deductive reasoning to arrive at valid premises upon which this same reasoning depends (aka begging the question).
The operation of natural selection in the real world situation of survival shows that absolute certainty is mostly unachievable and rarely needed. Animals – including humans – learn to hunt, forage or avoid danger in patterns that – if successful – are retained and repeated. If you go to the water hole 5 days in a row and there’s always water, you feel good about finding it there on the 6th day. You may even “feel 100% certain”, although your certainty is not justified.
I would like to know just what are the “methods and worldviews” that are as “correct” (i.e. the “map” is a good fit to perceptible reality) as science? I hope it’s not some sort of theistic inner sense of absolute certainty.
While a rudimentary form of science (aka “learning” in the animal world) – observing, testing, trying new things and observing the results – has been around for millions of years, the scientific method as idealistically formulated above is perhaps 200 – 400 years old. Meanwhile, “other methods and worldviews” have been around for 1000’s of years. What did they accomplish during that period? (And in what way are they truly “other”? Some forms of shamanism and herbology are based on observation and testing.) Scientists are getting around to studying and encompassing many topics previously assumed to be outside their purview. They are rapidly getting “…closer to proving their superiority in explain certain critical aspects of reality like human knowledge, human behavior or ethical conduct…” (par. 7) For example, in the past 20 years, studies of the human brain during religious ecstasy has yielded insights that 5000 years of theological and mystical experience could not produce.
Thanks, by the way, for providing this blog. I greatly enjoy your articles and their progression.
Chuck,
You aren’t getting the picture. Scientism is a philosophical position. It advocates that science is the _only_ reliable method. This means that scientism is _not_ reliable, since scientism _isn’t_ science and isn’t testable by scientific research. Scientism is therefore self-contradicting.
TomH,
I was previously unfamiliar with the term “scientism” so I just whipped out my “Oxford Companion to Philosophy” which says: “A successful accusation of scientism usually requires a restrictive conception of the sciences and an optimistic conception of the arts as hitherto practiced. Nobody espouses scientism; it is just detected in the writings of others. Among the accused are…W.V. Quine and Logical Positivism.” So as I previously supposed it is used only in the pejorative sense.
Now if scientism fails as per your schema (rephrasing it – if the knowledge and methods of science is a Set, Scientism is not a member of that Set because it wasn’t arrived at through the methodology of science and is not part of the body of accepted scientific knowledge) does that also apply to philosophical statements about other sorts of worldviews, say, revealed religious truth, intuitive truth, the arts, or radical pragmatism? Must a philosophy that extols painting BE a painting? Must a philosophy that lauds revealed truth over all else be itself a revelation from god? And so on. Or is it only Scientism which must be a member of the Set which it extols?
Contrary to your statement above (“scientism _isn’t_ science and isn’t testable by scientific research”) I can imagine designing a test which could determine whether scientism is correct. “Answering on a scale of 1 to 9, do you agree with these statements: science has benefited material life; scientific information is gathered through examination of the external world and or performing experiments; imagination is important in science (Einstein, Newton, etc.); if someone says they saw a flying saucer do you automatically believe them or would you like to see proof, scientific results can be retested and re-verified”. And so on. Ask 100 questions; give them to millions of people. The test results might show the consensus is that scientific methods don’t accomplish anything; they might show that they succeed on all or some of these measures. [They might show that few people understand science at all.] Either way, scientism is validated or falsified by scientific means. The results become part of the body of scientific knowledge.
Thus “scientism” can be considered an untested (as far as I know) conjecture, but one that is *capable* of statistical validation or falsification. Conjectures do not rise to the level of hypothesis or theory, but they certainly form part of the basement of scientific investigation. How do we test any statements about the superiority of other worldviews, such as revealed religion or intuitive spiritual knowledge? Most likely it will be by comparing those world-*views* to our own *view* of our supposedly independent external world. Is there a better method for such comparison that the methods used by scientists? If so, what is it? [I’m a big fan of “the arts” but as a pathway to knowledge…I’m not sure that is its main function.]
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